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Abstract
Adults recognize that if event A predicts event B, intervening on A might generate B. Research suggests that young children
have difficulty making this inference unless the events are initiated by goal-directed actions [1]. The current study tested the
domain-generality and development of this phenomenon. Replicating previous work, when the events involved a physical
outcome, toddlers (mean: 24 months) failed to generalize the outcome of spontaneously occurring predictive events to
their own interventions; toddlers did generalize from prediction to intervention when the events involved a psychological
outcome. We discuss these findings as they bear on the development of causal concepts.
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Introduction
Causal representations are central to human cognition. They
support prediction, explanation, and intervention and underlie
folk theories across domains [2–4]. Moreover, causal representa-
tions crosscut conceptual boundaries. Adults are equally adept at
reasoning about causal events initiated by an intentional, goal-
directed action (e.g., a baseball player hitting a ball), an inanimate
object (e.g., a tree falling on a car), or an unobserved entity (e.g., a
virus causing a disease). Critically however, developmental studies
of causal reasoning have tended to focus only on the first of these
contexts: children’s inferences in the context of an agent’s goal-
directed actions. Although considerable research suggests the
sophistication of children’s causal reasoning even early in
development [5–15], children are almost uniformly asked to
reason about events initiated by dispositional agents (e.g., people
or puppets). Investigations of Michottian causality [16] are an
important exception to this claim. However, Michottian causality
is arguably a modular process, divorced from causal knowledge
more broadly [17–20]. Thus although causal reasoning in early
childhood often appears to be an adult-like, domain-general
process, early causal reasoning abilities may, in fact, be predicated
upon representations of goal-directed actions.
Consistent with this hypothesis, research has shown that infants’
causal reasoning is closely related to their reasoning about
intentional agents and their goal-directed actions. Leslie, for
instance, showed that 6-month-old infants are sensitive to contact
causality between entities in a causal event when the event is
agent-initiated, but are insensitive to contact causality when the
event is object-initiated [21]. Additionally, infants have a default
expectation that agents, not objects, initiate caused motion. When
infants see an object emerge from behind a barrier already in
motion, infants expect a human hand, and not an object, to be
behind the barrier [22,23]. Even outside of the domain of caused
motion, infants’ causal inferences appear to be limited to events
initiated by goal-directed, intentional agents. When presented with
an occluded event in which a box breaks apart or plays music, 8.5-
month-old infants expect a relationship consistent with contact
causality when the event is initiated by a human hand but not
when the event is initiated by an object [24].
The influence of representations of agency on causal reasoning
continues beyond early infancy [1,25]. For example, Bonawitz and
colleagues [1] recently showed that even toddlers’ causal reasoning
is limited outside the context of intentional, goal-directed action.
Toddlers were shown several trials of predictive relations in which
a block spontaneously moved towards and contacted a base, at
which point a toy airplane connected to the base immediately
began to spin. For adults, evidence that event A predicts event B
suggests the possibility that intervening on A might generate B (i.e.,
intervening on A to see if B occurs is a good way to learn whether
the relationship is genuinely causal). However, although both four-
year-olds and toddlers readily learned the predictive relationship,
only four-year-olds anticipated the outcome following their
intervention (i.e., looked towards the toy after placing the block
in contact with the base). Toddlers succeeded only in restricted
contexts, in particular when the events were initiated by
dispositional agents.
These findings raise questions concerning the nature of the
relationship between representations of agency and causality early
in development. One possibility is that although toddlers can learn
predictive relationships among events [14,26], and can also learn
the relationship between their own and others’ interventions and
outcomes [27,28], they do not bind these two kinds of reasoning –
reasoning about predictive relationships and reasoning about
interventions – into a single, adult-like concept ‘‘cause’’. Indeed,
many researchers have proposed that adult humans may be
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unique in integrating the kind of predictive reasoning involved in
classical conditioning with the ability to anticipate the outcome of
interventions characterized by operant learning [6,29,30]. Al-
though non-human animals can make different predictions under
observation and intervention [31], there is no evidence that
animals spontaneously design novel interventions after learning
predictive relations. Arguably, this ability develops relatively late,
even in human ontogeny. Thus, infants and toddlers’ earliest
conception of causation may be limited to events involving
intentional agents and their goal-directed actions [1,24].
Alternatively, toddlers might have an adult-like concept of
causation but fail to understand some physical mechanisms of as
means of causal transmission. Research suggests, for instance, that
infants expect causation on contact [24,32–34] and that this
expectation persists through early childhood [8]. The conditions
under which toddlers fail to form causal representations may
violate these early expectations of contact causality. For example,
in Bonawitz and colleagues’ study [1], the block contacted a base,
which was connected to the toy by a bright orange wire. From an
adult perspective, a block contacting a base and activating an
airplane connected to the base by a wire does not violate contact
causality. However, it is possible that toddlers failed to understand
the wire as a means of causal contact: the lack of any apparent
transformation or visible transmission of force or energy within the
wire itself might impede the children’s ability to recognize the
event as an instantiation of contact causality. Indeed, toddlers were
more likely to succeed when the airplane was attached directly to
the base and no wire was involved.
This suggests the possibility that toddlers may be more likely to
use predictive relations as a basis for establishing a causal
representation of an event in domains involving less restrictive
transmission relations. In particular, toddlers might more success-
fully integrate prediction and intervention for psychological causal
events, which can occur either through direct contact or (and even
more typically) at a distance. By circumventing constraints on
toddlers’ expectations about mechanisms of causal transmission,
toddlers might have no difficulty with the basic task of expecting a
predictive relation to be representative of a causal relation.
Consistent with this possibility, previous research suggests that
young infants represent many aspects of psychological causal
relations. Schlottmann and colleagues, for example, have shown
that infants as young as 6 months of age seem to perceive causality
in simple social outcomes such as one object chasing another
object and causing it to flee [35–38]. However, infants’ success at
representing causal relations in looking-time paradigms does not
establish whether the representations underlying such success are
causal in the adult-like sense. Although infants may be able to
visually discriminate causal from non-causal psychological events,
they may not be able to form expectations for the outcomes of
their interventions on a psychological event. The current study
thus extends previous work on reasoning about psychological
causality by investigating whether young children use representa-
tions of predictive psychological relations to form expectations
about the outcomes of the interventions.
In the current study, we replicate Bonawitz and colleagues’
study [1] and compare toddlers’ causal reasoning about physical
outcomes with their reasoning about psychological outcomes. We
present toddlers with predictive events in which a block moves
spontaneously towards a base, which is connected to a toy. In the
Physical outcome condition, the toy is an airplane that immedi-
ately begins to spin; in the Psychological outcome condition, the
toy is a puppet who immediately begins to laugh. If toddlers lack a
domain-general concept of causation and only integrate prediction
and action when events are initiated by agents, they should fail to
represent the predictive event as a causal event in both conditions
because the block always begins to move spontaneously; agents are
never involved in initiating the events. By contrast, if toddlers have
a domain-general understanding of causation but simply fail to
understand some mechanisms of physical transmission, they
should fail in the physical condition but succeed in the
psychological condition.
Procedure, Results, and Discussion
All toddlers viewed a three-part predictive event in which (1) a
block spontaneously began to slide across a stage from rest towards
a base block and (2) contacted the base block, after which (3) an
effect occurred (see Figure 1). In the Physical outcome condition, a
small airplane, which was connected to the base by a wire, began
to spin. In the Psychological outcome condition, a puppet began to
laugh. Following familiarization with the predictive event, toddlers
were given the block and asked to make the effect occur.
The first set of analyses assessed whether toddlers had learned
the predictive relationship between the block’s motion and the
outcome. We assessed toddlers’ learning of the predictive event by
coding whether toddlers looked up towards the toy in the first
3 seconds following an Off trial during the familiarization phase.
During the Off trial, the block contacted the base, but the effect
did not occur. If in the experimenter’s online judgment (see coding
below) toddlers did not look up towards the toy within 3 seconds of
the block contacting the base, we presented an additional On trial
in which the effect occurred, followed by an additional Off trial.
Following each toddler’s final Off trial, they viewed one final On
trial, to show that the effect had not spontaneously stopped
occurring.
All results used for analyses were coded from videotape by two
coders blind to conditions. (See Methods.) In all cases where the
experimenter introduced a second Off trial the blind coders’
judgment agreed with the experimenter’s online judgment. Table 1
displays the results for all the analyses described below. Overall,
the majority of toddlers in both conditions looked up towards the
toy within 3 seconds of the block contacting the base, even though
the toy was not activating. We thus concluded that they learned
the predictive relationship: in the Physical outcome condition, 18
of the 22 toddlers (81.82%) looked up towards the toy airplane
after the block contacted the base; in the Psychological outcome
condition, 15 of the 16 toddlers (93.75%) looked up towards the
puppet after the block contacted the base. There was no significant
difference between the conditions (Fisher’s exact test, p=n.s.). Of
those toddlers that learned the predictive relationship, no toddlers
in the Psychological outcome condition and 3 toddlers in the
Physical outcome condition needed an additional Off trial (Fisher’s
exact test, p=n.s.). Although there were no significant differences
between conditions, children were only included in further
analyses if they learned the predictive relationship. This ensured
that any differences that emerged during subsequent phases were
not due to differential initial encoding of the predictive relation-
ship.
The next set of analyses explored toddlers’ ability to perform the
target action following the predictive events. Toddlers acted
spontaneously on the block in both conditions, although there was
a trend for more toddlers to act on the block spontaneously in the
Psychological outcome condition. Seven of the 18 toddlers
(38.89%) in the Physical outcome condition spontaneously placed
the block in contact with the base during the test phase. By
contrast, 11 of the 15 toddlers (73.33%) in the Psychological
outcome condition spontaneously performed the action (Fisher’s
exact test, p= .08). If toddlers failed to act spontaneously, the
Children’s Representation of Psychological Events
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Figure 1. Experimental procedures for the Psychological outcome, Physical outcome, Audience, and Epistemic Status conditions.
Toddlers viewed four On familiarization trials, an Off familiarization trial, and a final On familiarization trial. If toddlers failed to look towards the effect
in the Off familiarization trial, then they viewed two additional trials (On, Off) before the final On trial. In the Audience condition, the puppet was
audience member to the physical outcome event, laughing prior to the start of each trial. In the Epistemic Status condition, there was a wall between
the puppet and the blocks, and a blindfold was placed over the puppet’s eyes at the start of the experiment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0042495.g001
Table 1. Results.
Psychological
Outcome Physical Outcome Audience Epistemic Status
Total # of toddlers who participated in each
condition
16 22 22 18
Did toddlers learn the predictive
relationship?
Learned predictive relationship… 15/16 (93.75%) 18/22 (81.82%) 17/22 (77.27%) 17/18 (94.44%)
…during 1st Off trial 15 15 15 17
…during 2nd Off trial 0 3 2 0
Of those toddlers who learned the predictive relationship, did they
intervene in the event?
Intervened…
…spontaneously 11/15 (73.33%) 7/18 (38.89%) 10/17 (58.82%) 9/17 (52.94%)
…after prompt from experimenter 4/15 (26.67%) 8/18 (44.44%) 5/17 (29.41%) 6/17 (35.29%)
Of those toddlers who both learned the predictive relationship and
intervened on the event, did they look to the outcome?
Looked towards outcome 15/15 (100.00%)** 5/15 (33.33%) 6/15 (40.00%) 5/15 (33.33%)
**Fisher’s Exact, p,.01.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0042495.t001
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experimenter prompted them by moving the block part way
towards the base. All of the remaining 4 toddlers in the
Psychological outcome condition and 8 of the 11 remaining
toddlers in the Physical outcome condition completed the action.
Three toddlers in the Physical outcome condition failed to perform
the action either spontaneously or following a prompt and were
thus removed from further analysis.
Although toddlers were marginally more likely to act on the
block in the Psychological condition than in the Physical
condition, the action by itself is hard to interpret. Toddlers may
have been slightly more likely to act spontaneously in the
Psychological condition than the Physical condition because they
were more likely to treat the events as causal in the Psychological
than Physical condition. Alternatively, toddlers might have
understood the causal relationship equivalently in both conditions
(either failing to infer that either relationship was causal or inferring
that both were) and their tendency to act on the block might reflect
only different levels of overall motivation and engagement.
If toddlers truly represent the psychological, but not the
physical, outcome events causally, then toddlers should expect
their action on the block to bring about the effect only in the
Psychological condition. As a result, our primary measure of
interest was whether toddlers appeared to expect their own action
to generate the outcome. For the 15 toddlers in each condition
who both learned the predictive relationship and acted (either
spontaneously or after prompting) on the block, we coded whether
they looked up towards to the toy within a 3 second window after
they placed the block in contact with the base; the toy remained in
the OFF position after the toddlers’ interventions in both
conditions. In the Physical outcome condition, only 5 of the 15
toddlers (33.33%) looked to the toy after intervening. By contrast,
in the Psychological outcome condition, all of the toddlers did so
(15/15 toddlers; 100.00%; Fisher’s exact test, p,.0005).
These results suggest that the nature of the outcome (psycho-
logical vs. physical) influenced toddlers’ tendency to generalize the
outcome from the spontaneously occurring event to the conse-
quence of their own intervention. This is consistent with previous
research suggesting that toddlers have difficulty representing non-
agentive physical predictive relationships as potential causal
relationships [1,25]. Although toddlers learned the predictive
relationship between the block and the airplane’s motion and
acted on the block, toddlers did not look towards the airplane
following their action. We infer from this measure that toddlers did
not expect their action to cause the event to occur. By contrast,
toddlers did represent the predictive relation as a potential causal
relationship for the psychological outcome: they looked to see
whether their intervention generated the outcome.
Note that we always verified that the toddlers had learned the
predictive relationship by including a familiarization trial in which
the effect did not occur. Thus all the events presented occurred
probabilistically. One possibility is that toddlers are more willing to
accept probabilistic relationships for psychological events than
physical events. If so, toddlers might generalize the outcome in the
Psychological but not Physical condition because they are more
willing to accept probabilistic relationships among agents than
among objects. We think this interpretation is possible but unlikely
to account for the current results. Critically, Bonawitz and
colleagues’ study [1] included a deterministic physical condition
in which the block’s motion always resulted in the airplane’s
spinning. Children’s performance did not improve when the
physical condition was deterministic; toddlers were no more likely
to look towards the airplane following their intervention in the
deterministic condition than in the probabilistic conditions.
However, our results do provide some suggestive evidence that
the Psychological condition might have been more motivating and
engaging than the Physical condition. Although the children were
equally likely to learn the predictive relationship in both
conditions, there was a non-significant trend for toddlers to act
on the block more often in the Psychological outcome condition
than in the Physical outcome condition. To the degree that this
trend is meaningful, it might (as discussed) be due to different levels
of overall engagement with the task. If so, such differential
engagement (rather than differential sensitivity to the causal
relationships) might account for the condition differences.
To investigate the possibility that children’s interest in the
puppet contributed to children’s different performance in the
Psychological and Physical conditions, we ran an Audience
condition, intended to increase the children’s engagement with
the Physical outcome condition. In the Audience condition we
introduced a laughing puppet before each physical predictive event.
The children were instructed to greet the puppet and the puppet
laughed at the start of ever familiarization trial; the puppet’s
laughing was identical to that in the Psychological condition. If the
puppet’s laughing simply enhances toddlers’ arousal or increases
their motivation to participate in the task, then toddlers’
performance in this condition should improve. However, if, as
we hypothesize, toddlers have difficulty generalizing from predic-
tion to intervention for spontaneously occurring physical events,
then they should continue to fail to generalize the outcome
associated with the predictive event to their own interventions in
this condition.
Again, children were counted as learning a predictive relation-
ship if the independent coders judged that the child had look to the
(still and silent) puppet within 3 seconds of the block contacting the
base. First, we found that the majority of toddlers learned the
predictive relationship between the block and the effect (17 of 22
toddlers (77.27%)), no different from either the Psychological
outcome or Physical outcome conditions (Fisher’s exact tests,
p=n.s.). Of those toddlers who learned the predictive relationship,
two toddlers needed an additional Off trial; there was no
significant difference between this condition and either the
Physical outcome or Psychological outcome conditions in the
number toddlers needing an additional Off trial (Fisher’s exact
test, p=n.s.). Nonetheless, to ensure that subsequent results were
not due to toddlers’ failure to learn the initial predictive
relationship, toddlers who failed to learn the predictive relation-
ship (n = 5) were removed from subsequent analyses.
Toddlers’ tendency to act spontaneously on the block in the
Audience condition did not differ from either the Psychological
outcome or Physical outcome conditions (Fisher’s exact test,
p=n.s.). Ten of the 17 toddlers (58.82%) in the Audience
condition spontaneously intervened by placing the block in
contact with the base; five additional toddlers completed the
intervention following the experimenter’s prompted action. The
remaining toddlers who never performed the intervention (n= 2)
were removed from subsequent analysis.
As noted however, merely acting on the block does not mean
that children expected their action to cause the outcome. Thus our
final measure of interest again was whether, having learned the
predictive relationship and demonstrating their ability to perform
the target intervention, toddlers looked towards the outcome
following their intervention. Toddlers were significantly less likely
to look towards the outcome in the Audience condition than in the
Psychological outcome condition (6 of 15 toddlers (40.00%);
Fisher’s exact test, p,.001). Toddlers’ performance in this
condition was not significantly different from their performance
in the Physical outcome condition (Fisher’s exact test, p=n.s.).
Children’s Representation of Psychological Events
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These results suggest that although toddlers might have found
the psychological task (involving a laughing puppet) more
interesting or arousing than the physical task (involving the
airplane), differential attention, motivation, and arousal are
unlikely to account for toddlers’ different performance in the
Psychological outcome and Physical outcome conditions. The
presence of a laughing puppet in the Audience condition did not
significantly increase toddlers’ tendency to generalize the outcome
of their interventions from the outcomes learned predictively.
In a final study, we investigated whether constraints specific to
the domain of psychological causality affect toddlers’ tendency to
treat predictive relations as relations that might support effective
interventions. Although psychological events are not subject to a
contact constraint, they are subject to the epistemic state of the
participants. If the puppet cannot see or hear the block’s motion
and resulting contact, then he shouldn’t laugh in response to the
event. To test whether toddlers would (appropriately) fail to
represent psychologically implausible events causally, we ran an
Epistemic Status condition. In this condition, we blocked the
puppet’s visual access to the block’s motion by blindfolding the
puppet and placing a wall between the puppet and the blocks. We
pointed out that the puppet could not see or hear the events
behind the wall. If toddlers’ differential performance in the
Psychological outcome and Physical outcome conditions is due to
the toddlers’ understanding of psychological causality, then they
should not represent the predictive relation as a causal event when
the events are psychologically unlikely.
We found that the majority of toddlers learned the predictive
relationship between the block and the effect (17 of 18 toddlers
(94.44%)) and that this performance was no different from either
the Psychological outcome or Physical outcome conditions
(Fisher’s exact tests, p=n.s.). Of these 17 toddlers, all demonstrat-
ed learning of the predictive relationship on the first Off trial
(p=n.s., compared to the Physical outcome and Psychological
outcome conditions). One additional toddler was removed from
subsequent analyses for never having learned the predictive
relationship on either Off trial.
Toddlers were as likely to intervene in the Epistemic Status
condition as they were in the Psychological outcome and Physical
outcome conditions (Fisher’s exact test, p=n.s.). Nine of the 17
toddlers (52.94%) in the Epistemic Status condition spontaneously
intervened by placing the block in contact with the base, and six
additional toddlers completed the intervention following the
experimenter’s prompted action. The one remaining toddler,
who never performed the intervention, was removed from
subsequent analysis.
As in the previous studies, merely acting on the block is not
evidence that the children expected their action to cause the
outcome. Of the toddlers who learned the predictive relationship
and demonstrated their ability to perform the target action,
toddlers were significantly less likely to look towards the outcome
following their intervention in the Epistemic Status condition than
in the Psychological outcome condition (5 of 15 toddlers (33.33%);
Fisher’s exact test, p,.001); toddlers’ performance was not
significantly different from the Physical outcome condition
(Fisher’s exact test, p=n.s.).
These results suggest that toddlers’ causal representations of the
psychological event were subject to constraints specific to the
domain of psychological causality: toddlers did not represent the
predictive psychological outcome as a causal event when the
puppet lacked informational access to the block’s movement (i.e.,
in the Epistemic Status condition). Additionally, these results
replicate the Audience condition in suggesting that the mere
salient, arousing presence of a laughing puppet cannot account for
children’s different performance in the Physical and Psychological
conditions. Therefore, these results suggest that toddlers can
reason about causal events involving psychological outcomes even
when the initiating events occur spontaneously.
Previous work [1] left open the possibility that toddlers lacked a
domain-general concept of causation that integrated prediction
and intervention. The current study provides evidence against that
view. Toddlers were able to observe a non-agentive predictive
relationship and move from learning the predictive relationship to
designing an appropriate intervention and anticipating the
outcome. Critically however, they only did so when the outcome
was a psychological one. Arguably, this is because children do not
have an expectation of, and therefore do not perceive any violation
of, constraints on contact causality for psychological events; for
physical events, invisible transmission (through a wire) might
represent an apparent violation of contact causality. That is,
toddlers appear to have access to an integrated concept of
causation which bridges the gap between prediction and
intervention, but the events to which they apply this concept
depend on how causation is instantiated in particular domains.
How then do children reason about physical causal events? One
speculative possibility is that infants initially recognize agent-
initiated events – events involving their own actions or those other
goal-directed agents – as causal events [27,28,39,40–42]. With
respect to non-agentive events, infants might initially apply the
concept of causation only to contact causality resulting in object
motion [43,44]. Even recognizing causal relationships for non-
agentive contact events involving object changes of state (rather
than object motion) may be a later development [24]. By the
second year, toddlers may recognize non-agentive causal relation-
ships as long as there is a continuous, visible transmission of force
or energy [45]. Only relatively late in development may children
realize that they can engage in causal reasoning for a larger class of
events, including non-agentive events that occur without visible
transmission of energy or information (e.g., through wires or even
through invisible connections).
Future work might investigate this developmental story about
how children understand mechanisms of physical transmission.
Even if an account like this is correct however, the question
remains of why children readily accept the entire range of these
transmission events as causal, as long as goal-directed agents
initiate the events. Additional research might look at whether
children can bootstrap from their understanding of the goal-
directed causal events to their understanding of means of
transmission in the absence of dispositional agency.
Another outstanding question from this research concerns the
extent of toddlers’ understanding of psychological outcomes. The
current study investigated only one type of psychological outcome
(i.e., laughing). However, the class of events that encompass the
domain of psychological outcomes is vast. Events can make us
laugh, cry, perform an action, or inhibit a response. Moreover,
philosophers have long suggested that we may perceive psycho-
logical outcomes as ‘‘uncaused’’ insofar as we believe they are
generated by the agent’s free will; thus adults often draw a
distinction between reasons for actions and causes for actions [46].
Whether there is any sense in which infants and toddlers are
sensitive to the distinction between reasons and causes (and the
developmental trajectory of this distinction) remain areas ripe for
future inquiry.
The current results suggest that, although children have an
adult-like abstract understanding of the concept of causation that
binds prediction and action by two years of age, their ability to
recognize particular events as instances of causation may depend
on domain-specific constraints. Sensitivity to these constraints may
Children’s Representation of Psychological Events
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develop in a piecemeal manner, in which viable means of causal
transmission are learned event-by-event. This study thus adds to a
growing body of research suggesting that in tandem with or even
before they have an accurate understanding of the specific causal
mechanisms, young children have a rich, abstract understanding
of causality [4,9,47]. In some contexts, this understanding allows
even toddlers to perform novel interventions and accurately
predict the outcome of their own actions on the world.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Institutional Review
Board approved the procedures for all research described in this
paper. We obtained written consent from the participants’ parents.
Participants
Seventy-eight toddlers (mean: 24.5 months, range: 18–30
months) were recruited at two children’s museums. Toddlers were
assigned to one of four conditions: a Psychological outcome
condition (n = 16), a Physical outcome condition (n = 22), an
Audience condition (n = 22), or an Epistemic Status condition
(n = 18). Note that participants were recruited to match in the final
sample included for analysis (n = 15/condition); different n’s in
condition assignment reflect non-significant differences in the
number of participants failing to meet the inclusion criteria
described below. An additional 10 toddlers were recruited but not
included in the final sample due to: inability to complete the
session (n= 5; Psychological: 1, Physical: 2, Epistemic Status: 2),
parental interference (n = 3; Psychological: 1, Audience: 1,
Epistemic Status: 1), or experimenter error (n = 2; Physical: 1,
Audience: 1). There were no age differences between the
conditions (p=n.s.).
Materials
All events occurred on a white stage (30 in.612 in.) that blocked
a confederate from view (See Figure 1.) A blue block (the ‘‘base’’, 1
L in.62 in.63K in.) and a green block (1K in.61K in.62K
in.) were on opposite ends of the stage. The green block was
attached to a stick extending through the floor of the stage,
allowing the hidden confederate to surreptitiously move the block
across the stage to the base. In the Physical outcome condition, a
toy airplane, attached to the base by a wire, was located on the
back stage wall. In the Psychological outcome condition, a puppet
with eyes was seated on a perch on the back stage wall. The
confederate controlled the actions of the airplane and puppet. In
the Epistemic Status condition, there was also a blindfold on the
puppet so that the puppet’s eyes and ears were covered. In
addition, a wall (20 in.) was placed between the puppet and the
base so that the puppet had no visual access to the block or base.
Procedure
Psychological outcome condition. The experiment had
two phases: a familiarization phase and a test phase. There were
two types of familiarization trials: On trials and Off trials (see
Figure 1). Each toddler first viewed four On trials, in which the
block began at the far right of the stage. The experimenter drew
the toddler’s attention to the stage saying, ‘‘Watch my show.’’ The
block then moved spontaneously towards and contacted the base.
As soon as the block contacted the base, the puppet laughed and
wiggled for three seconds. At the end of the On trial, the stage was
covered by an occluder, and the scene was reset. Following the On
trials, the toddlers viewed one Off trial. The Off trials were
identical to the On trials except that the puppet did not laugh. The
experimenter ended the Off trial after the toddler looked towards
the puppet or after three seconds – whichever came first. If
toddlers did not look towards the effect during the Off trial, the
experimenter repeated another On trial, followed by another Off
trial. All toddlers then viewed one final On trial. Thus, if toddlers
looked towards the outcome on the first Off trial, they saw a total
of six trials; if they required a repetition, they saw a total of eight
trials.
At the start of the test phase, the experimenter handed the block
to the toddler and asked the child to make the effect occur. If the
child did not spontaneously place the block in contact with the
base, the experimenter prompted the toddler to place the block in
contact with the base. The prompt involved the experimenter
pushing the block across the stage towards, but stopping just short
of, the base block. The experimenter then handed the block back
to the toddler and encouraged them to make the effect occur.
Physical outcome condition. The Physical outcome condi-
tion was identical in structure (4 On trials, 1 Off trial, 1 On trial, 1
possible Off trial, 1 possible On trial) to the Psychological outcome
condition except that instead of a puppet laughing after the block’s
movement, a toy airplane spun for three seconds at the top left
corner of the stage (see Figure 1).
Audience condition. The Audience condition mirrored the
Physical outcome condition. Additionally, the puppet used in the
Psychological outcome condition was placed on the experimenter’s
lap and acted as an audience member with the toddler to the
familiarization events. At the start of each familiarization trial
(both On trials and Off trials), the experimenter drew the child’s
attention to the puppet, who was seated next to the stage, on the
experimenter’s lap. The experimenter asked the child to say hello
to the puppet, and the puppet then laughed and wiggled for three
seconds (exactly as in the Psychological outcome condition). After
the puppet laughed, the experimenter told the child that the
puppet was going to watch the show with them and then turned
the puppet to face the stage. The puppet laughed and turned
towards the stage in an identical manner prior to the start of every
familiarization trial. We had the puppet laugh before the trials
rather than after so that the puppet’s laughter could not be
construed as an effect; we had the puppet laugh on the
experimenter’s lap rather than on the stage so the puppet could
not be construed as a dispositional agent initiating the events. The
trials then proceeded as On trials or Off trials, which mirrored the
Physical outcome condition. During the test phase, the puppet did
not laugh. The experimenter gave the block to the child and asked
them to make the effect occur.
Epistemic Status condition. The Epistemic Status condi-
tion was identical to the Psychological outcome condition, except
as follows. Prior to the start of the familiarization phase, the
experimenter placed a blindfold over the puppet’s eyes. The
experimenter then told the toddler that the puppet could not see or
hear what was happening during the study (‘‘I’m going to cover his
eyes and his ears so that he can’t see or hear what is happening
during the show.’’). Additionally, a wall was placed between the
puppet and the blocks (prior to the child entering the room), such
that the puppet had no visual access to the predicting event. The
remainder of the familiarization phase was identical to that of the
Psychological outcome condition. The block spontaneously moved
towards and contacted the base, after which the puppet laughed
for 3 s.
Coding. Following data collection, two raters, blind to
experimental condition, independently scored toddlers’ behaviors.
75% of responses were double-coded; inter-rater agreement was
high (93.33%, kappa= .866).
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